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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to propose a rigorous and complete design 
framework for complex system based on system engineering (SE) principles. 
The SE standard EIA-632 is used to guide the approach. Within this framework, 
two aspects are presented. The first one concerns the integration of safety 
requirements and management in system engineering process. The objective is 
to help designers and engineers in managing safety of complex systems. The 
second aspect concerns model driven design through the definition of an 
information model. This model is based on SysML (System Modeling 
Language) to address requirements definition and their traceability towards the 
solution and the Verification and Validation (V&V) elements. 
Keywords: system engineering, safety, requirements, EIA-632, SysML. 
1   Introduction 
Systems engineering processes are becoming more and more critical and complex. 
A fundamental characteristic of modern systems is their inherent complexity (Bar-
yam, 2005). Complexity implies that different parts of the system are interdependent 
so that changes in one part may have effects on other parts of the system.  These 
complex systems include the emerging of multiple functions or behaviors, that was 
not possible before, and they are expected to satisfy additional constraints, especially 
constraints of reliability, safety and security which are specially addressed in this 
presentation.   
Safety of complex systems relies heavily on the emergent properties that result 
from the complex interdependencies that exist among the involved components, sub-
systems or systems and their environments. It is obvious that the safety properties of 
complex systems must be addressed in an overall study, with a global framework 
early in the design phase.  Weaknesses of the current safety processes can be resumed 
in the following points [2]: 
• Safety analysis involves some degree of intrinsic uncertainty. So, there is a 
degree of subjectivity in the identification of safety issues. 
• Different groups need to work with different views of the system (e.g. systems 
engineers’ view, safety engineers’ view). This is generally a benefit but it can 
be a weakness if the views are not consistent. 
• Definition of the safety requirements, their formalization, and their traceability 
can be ambiguous or not fully considered. 
• System models are developed in electronic form, but no use is made of this for 
Safety/ Reliability analysis. Ideally there should be a common repository of all 
requirements, design and safety information. 
Some of these points are due to the absence of a safety global approach. Indeed, 
safety must be addressed as global property and safety requirements [3] must be 
formulated not only in the small (sub-system level) but in the large (system level).  
One of SE processes is requirements engineering (RE) [4]. RE is generally 
considered in the literature as the most critical process within the development of 
complex systems [5], [6]. The safety requirements engineering are of concern. A 
common classification proposed for requirements in the literature classifies 
requirements as functional or non-functional [7]. Functional requirements describe the 
services that the system should provide, including the behavior of the system in 
particular situations. Non-functional requirements are related to emergent system 
properties such as safety attributes and response time or costs. Generally these Non-
functional properties cannot be attributed to a single system component. Rather, they 
emerge as a result of integrating system components. Furthermost, non-functional 
requirements are also considered as quality requirements, and are fundamental to 
determine the success of a system.  
 
Requirements engineering can be divided into 2 mains groups of activities [8]: 
 
1. Requirements development: this activity includes the processes of elicitation [9], 
documentation, analysis and validation of requirements. 
2. Requirements management: this activity includes processes of maintainability 
management, changes management and requirements traceability [3], [10]. 
 
In addition to other processes of system engineering which must be concerned by the 
safety evaluation, requirements engineering is not an exception.  Inadequate or 
misunderstood requirements have been recognized as the major cause of safety-
related catastrophes.  
The work presented in this paper is divided into two parts. The first part concerns 
the integration of safety management in system engineering process. The objective is 
to help engineers in safety management of complex system by proposing a new 
approach based on system engineering best practices which can be shared between 
safety and design engineers. The proposed approach is based on system engineering 
standard EIA-632. 
The second part presents an information model based on SysML language to 
address requirements definition and their traceability [3], [10] towards the solution 
elements and the V&V (Verification and Validation) elements. Safety requirements 
are integrated on RE activities, including management activities related to 
maintenance, traceability, and change management. 
The paper is structured into five sections. The second section introduces the design 
framework. The integration approach is presented in the third section. In the fourth 
section, the information model is proposed for efficient management of safety 
requirements. The last section gives some conclusions. 
2   System engineering approach  
The development process highlights the necessary activities, their sequencing and 
the obtained products. Two approaches for system design have been studied and have 
been defined. The V-cycle approach and its variants and the processes approach. The 
processes approach is based on the observation that whatever the strategy used to 
develop a system, these development activities remain the same. The technical 
processes are based on different activities of system engineering. They are divided 
into two categories, system definition processes and Verification and Validation 
(V&V) processes. They are defined by system engineering standards (IEEE 1220, 
EIA 632, ISO 15288). The processes approach is more flexible than the V-cycle 
development; it fits better with complex systems. Moreover, the processes vision does 
not constrain the sequence of development activities in contrast to the development 
based on a particular development cycle. This difference is another motivation for 
adopting a processes approach to systems engineering. In this work the process 
approach is based on EIA-632 SE standard. 
2.1 System engineering approach 
System Engineering is an interdisciplinary approach, which provides concepts to 
build new applications. It is a collaborative and interdisciplinary process of problems 
resolution, supporting knowledge, methods and techniques resulting from the sciences 
and experiment. System engineering is a framework which helps to define the wanted 
system, which satisfies identified needs and is acceptable for the environment, while 
seeking to balance the overall economy of the solution on all the aspects of the 
problem in all the phases of the development and the life of the system. SE concepts 
are adequate specifically for complex problems; research issues undergone can bring 
a solution [11]. In System engineering best practice, we have the following chain:  
Processes  Methods  Tools. 
These entities, such as processes, methods and tools, are the conceptual basis of 
our approach taken from System engineering best practice.  In the first step, the 
processes can be identified with respect to the accumulated know-how, and can also 
be taken from standards like the thirteen generic processes proposed in the EIA-632 
standard [12] [13]. The second step concerns the methods to be used. The methods 
can be either developed or existing one but only if it reflects the whole semantics of 
the process. No taxonomy has yet been developed for corresponding processes and 
methods. The third step concerns the tools that do not correspond to the processes but 
the methods; hence in this approach we cannot use a tool to implement a process 
without first identifying the associated methods. 
2.2 EIA-632 standard 
One famous standard, currently used in the industrial and military fields, is the 
EIA-632. This standard covers the product life cycle from the needs capture to the 
transfer to the user. It gives a system engineering methodology trough 13 interacting 
processes grouped into 5 groups, covering the management issues, the 
supply/acquisition, design and requirement, realization and verification/validation 
processes.  
 3 Integration approach 
Managing requirements, and specially safety requirements, at the early stages of 
system development becomes more and more important as system complexity is 
continuously growing. Safety of complex systems relies heavily on the emergent 
properties that result from the complex interdependencies that exist among the 
involved systems or sub systems and their environments. System Engineering (SE) is 
the ideal framework for the design of complex system. The need for systems 
engineering arose with the increase in complexity of systems and projects. A system 
engineering approach to safety starts with the basic assumption that  safety proprieties 
can only be treated adequately in their entirety when taking into account all the 
involved variables and the relations between the social and the technical aspects [14]. 
This basis for system engineering has been stated as the principle that a system is 
more than the sum of its parts. The Safety management must follow all the steps of 
SE from the requirements definition to the verification and the validation of the 
system. The starting point of the work presented in this paper is the following note 
provided in EIA-632 standard: 
Note: Standard does not purport to address all safety problems associated with its 
use or all applicable regulatory requirements. It is the responsibility of the user of 
this Standard to establish appropriate safety and health practices and to determine 
the applicability of regulatory limitations before its use [13].  
The next section aims to help designers in addressing safety problems. It describes, 
briefly, for each process, how the safety will be considered. It illustrates the proposed 
approach in term of process which must be defined independently to methods and/or 
tools (other projects are focused on the methods and tools ([15] [16] for example). 
3.1 Integration approach 
The integration of safety must concern all system engineering processes. This 
paper is focused only on System Design processes and Technical Evaluation 
processes. The implementation of the approach consists in identifying and indicating 
in which way the safety must be considered for each sub-processes of EIA-632. In 
other words, the sub-processes of EIA-632 standard are translated or refined in terms 
of safety and included in system design process. 
3.2 System design processes 
The System Design Processes are used to convert agreed-upon requirements of the 
acquirer into a set of realizable products that satisfy acquirer and other stakeholder 
requirements.  The safety requirements must be taken into account in requirements 
definition process. It allows the formulation, the definition, the formalization and the 
analysis of these requirements. Then a traceability [5] model must be build to ensure 
the consideration of the requirements throughout the development cycle of the 
system. 
3.2.1 Requirement definition process 
The goal of the requirements definition process is to transform the stakeholder 
requirements into a set of technical requirements. For functional and non-functional 
requirements, if this distinction is not possible or not relevant at the requirement 
elicitation process level, the analyzer may do it to categorize requirements. 
In the EIA-632 standard, three types of requirements are defined; the Acquirer 
Requirements, the Other Stakeholder Requirements and the System Technical 
Requirements. 
Concerning Acquirer Requirement and Other Stakeholder Requirements, the 
developer shall define a validated set of acquirer requirements for the system, or 
portion thereof. 
Safety requirements, generally, correspond to constraints in the system. It is 
necessary to identify and collect all constraints imposed by the acquirer to obtain a 
safe system. A hierarchical organization associates weight to safety requirements, 
following their criticality. Safety requirements can be derived from certification or 
quality requirements or can be explicitly expressed by acquirer or other stakeholder. 
The developer shall define a validated set of system technical requirements from 
the validated sets of acquirer requirements and other stakeholder requirements. For 
safety requirements, the system technical requirements traduce system performances. 
It consists on defining safety attributes (determine risk tolerability, SIL level, MTBF, 
MTBR, failure rate for example). Technical requirements can be derived from a 
preliminary hazard analysis.  
Some Standards are available to guide designer to define safety requirements. For 
example, safety critical systems within the civil aerospace sector are developed 
subject to the recommendations outlined in ARP4754 [17] and l’ARP-4761 [18]. 
These standards give guidance on the 'determination' of requirements, including 
requirements capture, requirements types and derived requirements. 
When requirements are defined, it is possible to define some attributes to facilitate 
their management by, for example, an expression of requirements using SysML. It 
allows to link requirements to the design solution. 
3.2.2 Solution Definition Process 
The Solution Definition Process is used to generate an acceptable design solution.  
For Logical Solution Representations, the developer shall define one or more 
validated sets of logical solution representations that conform with the technical 
requirements of the system. The recommendation is to use semi formal / formal 
models for the solution modeling. The use of formal models allows the automation of 
verification and analysis. In this processes, safety analysis techniques will be used to 
determine the best logical solution. 
The physical solution representations are derived from logical solution 
representation and must respect all requirements, particularly safety requirements. 
The same safety analysis may be done for the physical solution representation. The 
same recommendations than for logical solution remain true. 
3.3 Technical Evaluation Processes 
The Technical Evaluation Processes are intended to be invoked by one of the other 
processes for engineering a system. Four processes are involved: Systems Analysis, 
Requirements Validation, System Verification and End Products Validation.  
3.3.1 System Analysis Process 
In system analysis process, the developer shall perform risk analysis to develop 
risk management strategies, support management of risks and support decision 
making. The step of risk analysis can generate some safety requirements other than 
that defined by the acquirer and stakeholder. These new requirements must be taken 
into account. 
3.3.2 Requirements Validation Process 
Requirements Validation is critical to successful system product development and 
implementation. Requirements are validated when it is certain that they describe the 
input requirements and objectives such that the resulting system products can satisfy 
them.  In this process, a great attention is given to traceability analysis, which allows 
verifying all the links among Acquirer and Other Stakeholder Requirements, 
Technical and Derived Technical Requirements, and Logical Solution 
Representations. Like other requirements, safety requirements must be validated. The 
validation allows designing safe system.  
To facilitate this step, semi-formal solutions, like UML [19] or SysML [20] can be 
used for good formulation of requirements. Indeed, the diversity of people concerned 
by the system design project can have limited knowledge concerning the structure of 
the future system, that’s why industry-scale requirement engineering projects are so 
hard. So the use of UML or SysML with their different diagrams can be helpful. 
3.3.3 System Verification Process 
The System Verification Process is used to ascertain that the generated system 
design solution is consistent with its source requirements, in particular, safety 
requirements. Some traceability models allow defining the procedure of verifying 
safety requirement. These procedures are planned at the definition of safety 
requirement. Simulation is a good and current method used to achieve system 
verification. Other methods like virtual prototyping, model checking and tests can be 
used. 
4 Information model 
4.1 Requirements management 
Requirements management is a crucial activity for the success of a project [5]. 
Indeed, an important number of documents can be produced in the system definition 
phase. Without requirements management, it seems impossible to ensure the 
consistency and the quality necessary for success. Statistical studies show that the 
success or failure of a project depends, on 40%, on the definition and the management 
of requirements. Requirements management allows to: 
• collect requirements and facilitate their expression, 
• detect inconsistencies between them, 
• validate them, 
• manage requirements changes and ensure their traceability. 
It must also ensure that each requirement is properly declined, allocated, 
monitored, satisfied, verifiable, verified and justified. Figure 1 presents an overview 
of the requirements management of the EIA-632 standard. The proposed information 
model is inspired from this pattern. We see that Other stakeholder requirements, 
when added to the Acquirer requirements, make up a set of stakeholder requirements 
that are transformed into system technical requirements.  
The logical and physical solution representations are derived from technical 
requirements. Design solution and specified requirements are defined by completing 
the Solution Definition Process. 
4.2 Supporting the design 
An information model can be used to: 
• guide the design, 
• manage requirements changes, 
• evaluate project progress, 
• or simply to help to understand the system development, on the basis of a 
common and understandable language. 
Indeed, modelling is important for the following reasons: 
• it is a support for system analysis and design, 
• can be used for sharing knowledge, 
• it is used to capitalize knowledge. 
Modeling allows the transformation of needs into the system definition. In fact, 
during this transformation, we will gradually go from abstract concepts to a rigorous 
definition of the system. In modelling, there are 2 separate areas: the problem area 
and the possible solutions area. At the beginning of the project, the representation of 
the problem area is more important than the representation of the possible solutions 
area. During the progress of the design, representation of possible solutions area will 
be enriched to achieve the strict definition of the system. In parallel the overall 
representation of the problem area will be enriched to better define the expectations of 
the system (needs/requirements) until it is stabilized. The transition between the 
problem domain and the solution domain is a very delicate point of system 
engineering. It must be expressed by allocating requirements/properties/constraints on 
possible solutions. These allocations will generate traceability links which are crucial 
for the system verification and validation steps. We propose an information model 
that will be compatible with the requirements of the EIA-632 standard, while adding 
aspects of safety and risk management. We use SysML language to establish this 
information model thanks to the different available diagrams which make SysML as 
the language for systems engineering. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Requirements management of the EIA-632 
4.3 Requirements modeling and management for safety 
SysML is a systems modeling language that supports specification, analysis, 
design, verification and validation of a broad range of complex systems. The language 
is an evolution of UML 2.0 and is defined for systems that may include hardware, 
software, information, processes and personnel. It aims to facilitate the 
communication between heterogeneous teams (mechanical, electrical and software 
engineers for instance) who work together. The language is effective in specifying 
requirements, structure, behaviour, allocations of elements to models, and constraints 
on system properties to support engineering analysis. SysML, through a unique 
environment integrating requirements, allows modeling and supports different views: 
• The requirements: Requirements diagram, Use Case diagram, 
• The structure: Block diagram (internal/external), 
• The behaviour: Statechart, Activity diagram, Sequence diagram, 
• The constraints: Parametric Diagram. 
 
So, SysML seems be an excellent candidate for a common language. It allows sharing 
specifications of a complex system between different trades. Between design 
engineers and safety engineers in our case. Among other benefits of SysML, we can 
cite:  
• Risks identification and creation of a common analytical basis to all 
participants of the project. 
• Facilitates the management of complex projects, the scalability and the 
maintainability of complex systems. 
• Documents and capitalizes the knowledge of all trades in a project. 
 
SysML provides the opportunity to express the requirements using the requirements 
diagram. It also defines some relationships that link a given requirement to other 
requirements or elements of the model. It becomes possible to define a hierarchy 
between requirements, requirement derivation, and requirement satisfaction by a 
model element, the requirement verification by a test case (TestCase) or the 
requirement refinement. So, this language forms a good basis for our information 
model. Indeed, in the system definition process, it is necessary to establish a 
relationship between the identified requirements and the system functions and/or 
components. 
The traceability models linking requirements to the system components allow 
performing impact analysis of requirements change or modification. Thus, it is 
possible to assess the consequences of a requirement change on the system safety 
using the network built between requirements, functions and components. 
4.4 Proposition 
In this part, we propose a system approach to improve requirements management 
for safe system design. This approach is based on a SysML information model, 
following the SE process of the EIA-632 standard. This information model is the 
"system" knowledge basis of the design project, allowing data sharing between all 
expertise trades (mechanical, hydraulic, thermal, electrical...). Therefore, the model is 
intended to model the "system" level, showing the interactions with the environment 
and the connections between the various subsystems. 
The information model must be seen as a means of knowledge sharing, including 
the 3 components: requirements, design solution and V&V. It is considered as the 
interconnection level between all the different trades. 
The safety authorities impose a separation of system design concepts. The 
requirements, the design solution and the V&V parts must be developed 
independently. We must be able to distinguish clearly these different concepts. 
Based on the previous observation, the proposed approach allows the expression of 
all the concepts, with a separation between these concepts but with a creation of 
traceability link between these concepts in order to facilitate understanding and 
impacts analysis. 
With SysML, it is easy and possible to mix all the concepts in a single diagram. We 
propose an extension of SysML and information meta-model that allows structuring 
the elements of the design project with respect of the separation concepts. In other 
words, our approach allows a rigorous organization of the project design. Indeed, 
different diagrams manage different concepts. 
4.5 The information model 
The information model (Figure 2) that we propose is adapted to the EIA-632 
standard,  making a clear distinction between different requirements classes (acquirer, 
other stakeholders, technical or specified). 
To achieve this meta-model in SysML, we have extended the language. Firstly, we 
define new stereotypes to requirements, while adding new attributes to our 
requirements. Then we define a new link type (specify) linking the specified 
requirements to model elements. 
 
Fig.2. Information model  
In this model, we have simplified the number of requirements classes. Indeed, we 
consider that the "systemTechnicalReqt" represents the system technical requirements, 
but also the system technical requirements non-allocated to the logical solution and 
the derived technical requirements coming from the logical and the physical solutions. 
The acquirer and other stakeholders’ requirements are represented, knowing that 
the field ‘requirement source’ must be consistent with the stereotype and indicates 
better the concerned stakeholders in the case of "OtherStakeholderReqt". 
Note: We invite readers who are not necessarily friendly with all the above 
concepts (system technical requirements, logical solution, physical solution …) to 
refer themselves to the EIA-632 standard [13]. 
All traceability links requested by the EIA-632 are considered in this model, and 
the distinction between logical solution (functional part) and physical solution 
(component part) appears. 
In this model, we highlight the definition of interfaces, which are components 
themselves and which links several components together. The concept of interface is 
essential for a proper system design. Indeed, it is one source of problems encountered 
during development. 
The last important element that is included in this model, neither a requirement nor 
a design solution element, is the "TestCase". These elements of V&V are included in 
the model to be directly connected to the requirements they satisfy. 
Concerning safety requirements and the consideration of safety in design, which 
can be derived from risk analysis, a block risk is defined and is linked to safety 
requirements (see figure 3). In fact, identification of risks is the starting point for 
many studies about security, but also reliability. Thus, defining a block “risk” in the 
information model and its link with the safety requirements, allows on one way to 
improve the system understanding and justifying the requirement, and on the other 
way to show that all the identified risks are taken into account.  
Impact analyses also derive benefit from the presence of risks in the information 
model, because the risks, which could be challenged by model element (requirement, 
function, component…) changing, can be viewed directly. 
 
 
Fig. 3. From risk to safety requirements  
5. Conclusion  
Our contribution in this paper can be summarized in the following points: firstly, 
we illustrate the importance of a global approach for safety evaluation and 
management. Considering this point we proposed a system engineering approach 
based on EIA-632 standard. Then we have focused our presentation on the integration 
of safety management in system engineering processes from requirements definition 
process to verification and validation process.   
Requirements engineering is a crucial activity for the success of a project of 
complex system design and development. An effective requirements management is 
necessary. So, in the second part we introduced an information model based on the 
SysML language. We proposed an extension of this language to define a meta-model 
by adding new stereotypes for requirements and new attributes to requirements. We 
also defined a new type of links (specify) which link specified requirements to the 
elements of the model. The proposed model allows the expression of all the handled 
concepts, and the creation of traceability links between the concepts to facilitate the 
comprehension and/or the impacts analysis. 
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